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I. Introduction 
The power to act unilaterally by executive order is perhaps the broadest administrative 
tool that Michigan’s governors possesses under the Michigan Constitution of 1963.  Functioning 
as legal, policy and political tools, executive orders have been increasingly used by Michigan 
governors over the past four decades to exercise control over the executive branch and to 
enhance political power.  However, despite the broad implications of Michigan’s governors’ 
ability to act by executive order, Michigan’s citizens’ public awareness, much less 
understanding, of this power is extremely limited. 
The lack of public knowledge of Michigan’s governors’ ability to act by executive order 
is compounded by the fact that the scope and the boundaries of this power are often defined in a 
limited fashion, if at all.  Although limited illustrations of the power exist in case law and in 
commentaries examining the powers of other state governors, no authoritative reference detailing 
the executive order powers of Michigan’s governors has been advanced until now.  Therefore, in 
order to contribute to the public understanding of the system by which it is governed and the 
individuals who operate within that system, this article will detail the historical development of 
gubernatorial executive order powers in Michigan, and serve as a reference regarding the scope 
of the governor’s ability to act by executive order. 
Part II of this article presents background information on of executive orders, including 
the executive power of governors, the historical origin of gubernatorial executive orders; the 
general types of executive orders; and the typical form of executive orders.  Part III examines the 
historical development of gubernatorial executive orders in Michigan, focusing on the weakness 
of the governor under the 1908 Constitution, the 1961 Constitutional Convention, and the 
implementation of the 1963 Constitution.  Finally, Part IV sets forth the current scope of the 
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Governor’s executive order powers, including rules of construction and interpretation, 
constitutional bases of power traditionally cited in executive orders, and constitutional bases of 
power not traditionally cited in executive orders; and concludes by examining the governor’s 
inherent authority to act by executive order as the chief executive. 
 
II. Background 
A. Gubernatorial Executive Power 
Three classes of governors exist in the United States: state, territorial, and military.  A 
state governor is the chief executive officer of one of the states, a territorial governor is the chief 
executive officer of a territory, and a military governor is the chief executive officer of a state, 
who is appointed by the President during a time of war when the civil authority of the state 
cannot be maintained.1 
Generally, the people of a state vest the supreme executive power of the state in a 
governor via the state’s constitution.  The people of the State of Michigan have vested the 
executive power of Michigan’s state government in the governor under Article 5, section 1 of the 
Michigan Constitution of 1963 which provides,  “[t]he executive power is vested in the 
governor.”  Thus, the Governor is the chief executive of the State of Michigan. 
As the highest executive authority in the state, the office of governor is “one of high 
dignity in which the people have a paramount interest.”2  The governor of a state represents all of 
the people in the performance of his or her duties, and those acts that are authorized become 
binding on all citizens of that state.3  However, the actual exercise of gubernatorial power is 
highly prescribed.  The office of governor is a constitutional office with powers delegated by the 
people, and as a result, a governor does not exist under common law or possess common law 
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powers.4  Since the governor is a mere executive officer, her general authority is narrowly 
limited by the constitution of the state.5  Accordingly: 
The governor has no prerogative powers, but possesses only those powers and 
duties as are vested in [her] by constitutional grant or by statutory grant.  The 
extent and exercise of the governor’s powers under statute will depend on the 
particular provisions thereof, and [her] duties under statutory provisions are 
circumscribed by the terms of the legislation; but in acting or failing to act in [her] 
official capacity the governor is always subject to constitutional limitations…  
Generally, the duties of the governor may be limited to those imposed on [her] by 
the constitution, but it has also been held that the legislature may require the 
governor to perform duties other than those specified in the constitution.6 
Nevertheless, a constitutional grant of supreme executive power implies the power 
necessary to secure the efficient and fair execution of the law, so long as that power is exercised 
within constitutional and statutory limitations.7 
A governor bears the same relation to a state as the President does to the federal 
government, and a governor is normally entitled to the same immunities, privileges and 
exemptions in the discharge of gubernatorial duties.8  Thus, in practical terms, a governor 
receives her power only through legislative enactment or by constitutional provision, and the 
governor cannot alter, expand, or diminish that power.  Correspondingly, the legislature of a state 
may not interfere with a state governor’s exercise of gubernatorial powers that are granted by a 
state’s constitution. 
B. Historical Origin of Gubernatorial Executive Orders 
Although the presidential power to issue executive orders was first utilized by George 
Washington,9 state governors typically did not begin to use gubernatorial executive orders until 
after the presidential terms of Andrew Jackson.10  Gubernatorial executive orders generally arose 
as an indirect result of the Jacksonian era fractionalization of state executive branches and the 
proliferation of elective state administrative offices.11  Although initially afforded a weak status 
vis-à-vis state legislatures in the early years of the republic, state governors were gradually able 
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to use the growth of the independence and prestige of their offices to increase their power 
through developments such as direct popular election of the governor, extended terms in office, 
the reintroduction of the gubernatorial veto (albeit in qualified form) and the decline of public 
confidence in the effectiveness of the legislature as the chief mechanism of state government.12 
However, even as the powers of state governors increased, governors found these 
increases mitigated by the rise in the number of independent or semi-independent state agencies 
corresponding with the increasing number of functions in which the state engaged.13  Governors 
often found themselves left with little, if any, real control over independent and semi-
independent agencies, as oversight of these agencies often reposed only in the state legislature.14  
Initially, state functions were limited, so the rise of so many autonomous agencies presented little 
problem.15  But as state services, state employees, and, most importantly, state expenditures 
began to increase exponentially in the twentieth century, governors’ relative lack of control over 
so many areas of state government began to present increasing problems.16  Ultimately, many 
governors started to advocate a strengthening of their power in order to exercise general control 
over all or most state administrative functions.17 
Initially, states sought to achieve such a result through consolidation of the numerous 
independent and semi-independent agencies.18  Other attempted solutions included the 
substitution of appointed agency heads for independently elected individuals and fiscal reforms 
granting governors powers in the areas of budget preparation and execution.19  However, no one 
solution proved to be a panacea to the problems of effectively administering state government.20  
Thus, states began to increasingly see the gubernatorial power to issue executive orders as an 
effective manner in which to solve the problems of controlling and administering state 
government.21 
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C. Types of Gubernatorial Executive Orders 
In granting governors the power to issue executive orders, states have recognized that two 
of the most potent managerial tools to effectively administer state government include the power 
to direct, and the power to remove.22  Although removal powers generally depend on some 
constitutional or statutory authority, the power to direct is often poorly defined, if specified at all 
in state constitutions.23  Some states provide for a gubernatorial ordinance power or a general 
power of executive order by constitution or statute, but clear parameters are often omitted, 
making the scope of such power subject to controversy. 
Nevertheless in jurisdictions recognizing such powers, whether by common law, 
constitution or statute, executive orders are generally classified in one of three categories: (1) 
ceremonial and political proclamations, (2) gubernatorial ordinances, and (3) orders for 
administrative direction and control.24  However, although the bulk of executive orders fall 
within these three categories, they are neither exhaustive, nor mutually exclusive: some 
executive orders resist being classified into neat analytical divisions.25 
  1. Ceremonial and Political Proclamations 
 Ceremonial and political proclamations are generally proclamations establishing special 
days or weeks.26  Governors often issue these proclamations for the purpose of recognizing 
contributions to society by organizations or individuals, memorializing individuals or events, 
commemorating important dates, and raising awareness of societal problems.27  Although 
gubernatorial proclamations are usually issued under the great seal of the state and over the 
governor’s signature, and published or proclaimed to the public at large, they may convey legal 
effect or only ceremonial significance. 28 
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2. Gubernatorial Ordinances 
 Gubernatorial ordinances are regulations or ordinances which “affect the public at large, 
generally have the force of law, and serve to implement or supplement the constitution and laws 
of the state.”29  Such regulations or ordinances are usually issued pursuant to statutory authority 
granted by the legislature or pursuant to specific or general constitutional authority.30  
Additionally, some governors have attempted to issue gubernatorial regulations or ordinances in 
order to effectuate the constitution itself, although such attempts may run the risk of being 
deemed unconstitutional under a separation of powers analysis as a usurpation of the policy-
making prerogative of the legislature.31  Gubernatorial ordinances generally possess the same 
characteristics and are grounded in the same legal bases as orders for administrative direction 
and control.32  Thus, courts usually examine the applicability of gubernatorial ordinances in light 
of the precedents controlling orders for administrative direction and control.33 
  3. Orders for Administrative Direction and Control 
 Orders for administrative direction and control consolidate administrative power in the 
governor and operate as instruments of executive authority.34  The form and style of such orders 
varies from state to state and from governor to governor, based on factors such as the subject 
matter within the order; the objects to which the order is directed; the goal or desired result of the 
order; the express or implied consequences for noncompliance with the order; and the legal bases 
upon which the order is issued.35  Orders for administrative direction and control may generally 
fall anywhere on a spectrum between discretionary orders that merely request a course of action 
or result, and mandatory orders that dictate the specific course of action and result desired.36 
Furthermore, in addition to making use of the governor’s power to direct, mandatory 
orders may also effectuate the governor’s removal power as a consequence of noncompliance.37  
 8
Thus, of the five previously mentioned factors which determine the ultimate form of an order for 
administrative direction and control, the most important factor may be the legal base or bases 
upon which the order is issued, for those bases usually determine what other factors may also be 
implicated.38 
 D. Form of Gubernatorial Executive Orders 
Gubernatorial executive orders generally resemble other types of law and are relatively 
uniform in structure from one to another.39  Most executive orders are usually composed of four 
distinct parts. The first part usually contains paragraphs starting with “whereas,” followed by a 
statement of the legal bases upon which the governor is issuing the order.  This part will usually 
contain a clause stating the location of the constitutional and statutory authority for the order (if 
applicable), as well as a statement illustrating the particular relevance of that authority to the 
immediate situation.40  Sometimes this part is also used to make broad political statements or 
pronouncements on issues unrelated to the order or outside of the governor’s ability to directly 
affect by executive order.41 
The second part of an executive order generally contains clauses also beginning with the 
word “whereas,” but these clauses detail the specific context of the order.  An order will 
generally contain of number of these clauses stating the nature of the situation, why or how the 
situation arose, and why the governor needs to issue an executive order in relation to the 
situation.42 
The third part of an executive order often contains a statement of direction by the 
governor.  This statement is the substance of the order,43 and it details the specific actions the 
governor requires to be taken and the timetable by which they are to be completed.  “The length 
 9
of this section depends upon the nature and complexity of the order itself and may range from a 
single paragraph to a number of pages.”44 
Finally, the fourth part of an executive order is usually composed of formalities relating 
to the filing of the order itself, such as the date of issue, the signature of the issuing governor, the 
seal of the state where the order was issued, and the signature of the secretary of state who 
affixed the seal and files the order. 
 
III. Historical Development of Gubernatorial Executive Orders in Michigan 
A. The Weak Executive under the 1908 Constitution 
Like many other states, the State of Michigan historically has found itself forced to deal 
with the problems inherent in a weak chief executive.  The Michigan Constitution of 1908 
reflects the Jacksonian era fractionalization of the executive branch. Conservative Republicans 
had dominated the 1907 constitutional convention, resisting wholesale change, and the 1908 
constitution ultimately represented little more than a reorganization and slight expansion of the 
Michigan Constitution of 1850.45 
By the late 1950’s, the state faced unresolved fiscal problems, controversy over 
legislative apportionment, and weakness in the executive branch with regard to the legislature.46  
In 1961 the executive branch contained approximately 130 different state administrative 
agencies, boards, commissions and departments.47  These problems led rapidly to a growing 
sense that the only solution to the problems in state government was a complete overhaul of the 
entire governmental structure.48   
However, although the Michigan Constitution of 1908 contained provisions making it 
relatively easy to amend, wholesale revision of the constitution was somewhat difficult.49  Under 
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the 1908 Constitution, the question of a new constitutional convention was put before the voters 
only once every 16 years.50  Otherwise, a new constitutional convention could only be called if 
ratified by a majority of the total votes cast in an election.51  Nevertheless, although this 
requirement proved to be an overwhelming obstacle to wholesale revision,52 it was ultimately 
surmounted by a constitutional amendment in 1960,53 and in April of 1961 a majority of voters 
approved a referendum calling a constitutional convention.54  Thereafter, Michigan voters chose 
144 delegates in September 1961 to draft a new constitution.55 
B. The Constitutional Convention of 1961 
The delegates to the constitutional convention assembled on October 3, 1961 in Lansing 
and set to work immediately.56  One of the main focuses of the convention was the re-
organization and the strengthening of the executive branch.  In the words of one delegate: 
[I]n the last 20 or 25 or 30 years, the number of state boards, agencies, 
departments, authorities, commissions and so on has increased and increased 
without any relation to any kind of logical structure.. [T]here is absolutely no 
thyme or reason to the structure of the state government…  [R]eorganization is a 
must if the governor is to have a structure of government such that he can 
maintain contact with the heads of his principal departments in such a way as to 
not only know what is going on but to be able to give some supervision and 
direction to the functioning of state government.57 
 
 Completing their work on August 1, 1962, the delegates ultimately agreed to provide for 
a stronger governor in the interest of administrative efficiency.58  The most emblematic change 
from the constitution of 1908 was the elimination of the adjective “chief” when describing the 
executive power vested in the governor.59  The adjective had been interpreted as a limitation on 
the governor’s power, and as such was discarded so the language would properly reflect the 
“major responsibility the governor bears for the executive branch.”60 
The delegates also extended the governor’s term of office to four years in order to lessen 
the concern of the immediate political consequences of gubernatorial action, and set 
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gubernatorial elections in years in which no presidential election was to take place in order to 
reduce the likelihood that national political issues would intrude into the election of the state’s 
chief executive.61  Additionally, the delegates agreed to provide for the consolidation of almost 
all state agencies into a maximum of 20 departments, most headed by single executives 
appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate.62 
Finally, the delegates agreed to grant the governor specifically enumerated powers that 
had not appeared in the 1908 constitution, such as the power to re-organize the executive branch 
according to his discretion; the power to establish temporary commissions existing 
independently of the 20 departments specified in section 2; the power to initiate court 
proceedings to enforce compliance with any constitutional or legislative mandate; and the power 
to reduce expenditures from appropriations under certain circumstances.63 
Thus, although certain constraints were placed on the use of some powers, the governor 
was granted wide authority to administrate the state as he saw fit.  On April 1, 1963, a majority 
of Michigan voters agreed and ratified the Michigan Constitution of 1963.64 
 C. Implementation of the 1963 Constitution  
1. 1964 to 1991: Governors Romney, Milliken and Blanchard  
After its successful ratification in April, 1963, the Michigan Constitution of 1963 entered 
into effect on January 1, 1964.65  The first governor to serve under the new constitution was 
George Romney.66  Governor Romney served from 1963 to 1969 and began issuing executive 
orders in 1964.  However, Governor Romney issued these first executive orders solely pursuant 
to his emergency powers.  In these orders Governor Romney began the practice in Michigan of 
issuing a proclamation declaring a state of emergency or disaster, and then issuing a separate 
executive order on the basis of that proclamation.67 
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In 1965, Governor Romney began issuing more executive orders on a further variety of 
subjects.  In addition to executive orders pursuant to his emergency powers,68 Romney issued 
executive orders pursuant to his power to create temporary commissions,69 his power to suspend 
or remove state officers,70 his power to re-organize the executive branch,71 and his supervisory 
powers as the chief executive officer.72  These orders set forth what was to become the typical 
structure of executive orders in Michigan: “whereas” clauses setting forth the governor’s 
authority to issue the order, followed by a statement of the action intended by the governor, as 
well as the intended results. 
Governor Romney also began issuing other types of executive orders in the form of 
documents titled “executive directives,” establishing the precedent in Michigan whereby 
gubernatorial executive orders issued in Michigan under the 1963 Constitution are formally 
designated as “Executive Orders,” “Executive Directives,” or “Proclamations.”  Although 
Michigan’s gubernatorial Executive Orders, Directives and Proclamations are all executive 
orders in the broad sense of the term, for the sake of clarity, this article will hereinafter refer to 
executive orders in their broad sense as “executive orders,” while any examples of “Executive 
Orders,” “Executive Directives,” or “Proclamations” will refer specifically to the documents 
officially titled as such when issued by Michigan governors.  Furthermore, “Executive Re-
organization Orders” will refer to any Executive Orders that re-organize the executive branch, 
even though such Orders are officially designated “Executive Orders.” 
Executive Directives, while generally regarded as executive orders in the broad sense, 
differ from Michigan gubernatorial Executive Orders in that Executive Directives are often 
illustrations of the governor’s administrative authority and are aimed almost exclusively at 
subordinates in the executive branch.  Executive Directives are usually official, written 
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communications of the internal governing policies of the Governor to members of her cabinet 
and senior staff.  The purpose of Executive Directives is to state clearly and concisely the 
governor’s expectation of the policies, practices and procedures various departments, agencies 
and senior staff of the governor will uniformly follow during the governor’s tenure.  Although 
Executive Directives may stand alone, in some instances they may also act as a companion to 
Executive Orders, giving clarification to particular departments as to their responsibility in 
carrying out an Executive Order.73 
 Additionally, Michigan governors may also generally use an Executive Directive to 
accomplish a purpose that could be achieved just as well through an Executive Order.74  
Although not usually the case, one reason for doing so may be to protect the Executive Directive 
from any possible interference by the legislature.  As will be examined later, Article 5, section 2 
of the 1963 Constitution authorizes the governor to re-organize the executive branch.  Similarly, 
Article 5, section 8 authorizes the governor to supervise the executive branch.  One major 
difference between these two provisions is that section 2 grants the legislature a veto over 
gubernatorial actions taken pursuant to that section, while section 8 does not. 
If an Executive Order is issued with regards to the executive branch, members of the 
legislature might interpret that Order as having been issued pursuant to Article 5, section 2, and 
accordingly, those legislators might attempt to exercise their constitutional veto power under 
section 2 to block the measure.  Conversely, an Executive Directive that accomplishes the same 
result will more likely be interpreted as having been issued pursuant to Article 5, section 8, thus 
denying the legislature the opportunity to to interfere with the governor’s action.75 
When William G. Milliken succeeded Romney as governor, he continued to issue 
Executive Orders, Executive Directives and Proclamations in the same manner Governor 
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Romney had begun.76  However, as his term of office drew on, Governor Milliken began to make 
further use of the gubernatorial power to re-organize the executive branch.  Although tentative at 
first,77 Governor Milliken’s Executive Re-organization Orders began gradually to evolve in both 
the complexity and the number of subjects they embraced.78  Additionally, as the state slumped 
through two back-to-back recessions in the 1970’s,79 Governor Milliken became the first 
Michigan governor to utilize his constitutional power to reduce appropriations, issuing his first 
Executive Order reducing appropriations in 1970,80 and continuing to periodically issue similar 
Executive Orders reducing appropriations over the next twelve years. 
Governor James J. Blanchard,81 Governor Milliken’s successor, also continued to issue 
Executive Orders, Directives and Proclamations in the same style Governor Romney had 
established.  Governor Blanchard took office in 1983 facing a $1.7 billion budget deficit and a 
nationwide recession. 82  Not surprisingly, Governor Blanchard appears to have issued a number 
of his initial Executive Orders in reaction to the state of the economy, as most of them deal with 
job creation and budget reduction.  However, overall, Governor Blanchard’s orders broke little 
ground from those of his predecessors.  Thus, when Governor Blanchard left office on January 1, 
1991,83 the boundaries of the legal status, form and substance of Michigan’s gubernatorial 
executive orders seemed fairly well settled. 
 2. 1991 to 2004: Governors Engler and Granholm 
Nonetheless, after Governor John M. Engler84 assumed office, any individuals who 
believed that Michigan’s first three governors under the 1963 Constitution had reached the limit 
of their gubernatorial executive order powers realized their mistake.  Although, Governor Engler 
stayed within the framework established by Governor Romney in many respects, Governor 
Engler vastly increased the use of Executive Re-organization Orders, both in terms of the 
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number issued, as well as the scope of the objects embraced.  For example, during his first year 
in office, Governor Engler issued 26 Executive Re-organization Orders.85  In contrast, Governor 
Milliken had issued only eight Executive Re-organization Orders in 1973, the calendar year that 
had previously seen the issuance of the most Executive Re-organization Orders.86  Through the 
use of Executive Re-organization Orders, and subsequent court decisions upholding this use, 
Governor Engler was able to establish in the governor a self-executing quasi-legislative authority 
over the executive branch, giving him the power to create, abolish or transfer entities, powers 
and functions as he saw fit.87 
Thus, when Jennifer M. Granholm88 assumed the office of Governor, she inherited the 
precedent with respect to most powers set by Governor Romney, as well as the expansive re-
organization authority secured to the office by Governor Engler.  During her first year in office, 
Governor Granholm issued “executive orders,” under her supervisory powers relating to two 
ethics measures;89 created eight temporary commissions or agencies;90 acted four times under her 
emergency powers;91 re-organized the executive branch twice;92 and ordered two expenditure 
reductions.93   Additionally, she also issued 25 executive directives establishing guidelines and 
procedures for members of the executive branch to follow.94 
 
IV. Scope of Gubernatorial Executive Order Powers under the 1963 Constitution 
 A. Rules of Construction and Interpretation 
Michigan’s governors possess only those powers granted to them by the state 
constitution.95  Consequently, gubernatorial executive orders in Michigan must be issued 
pursuant to at least one provision of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, whether or not the 
specific provision is explicitly stated in the order itself or implied therein.  As the validity and 
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effect of an executive order stems from constitutional provisions, the meaning ascribed to those 
provisions is of critical importance.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has developed a number of 
guidelines for interpreting the 1963 Constitution. 
The primary rule of constitutional construction in Michigan is the rule of the “common 
understanding” of the purpose and intent of the people who adopted the provision at issue.96  The 
intent to be determined is that of the people who adopted the constitutional provision at issue.  
Intent should be determined by reference to the state of the law or custom previously existing, 
and by contemporaneous construction, rather than by reference to the changed views of the 
present day.97  Thus, a court should place itself in the position of the framers to ascertain what 
was meant at the time the provision was adopted. 98  To that end, both the "Address to the 
People" and the convention debates may be consulted.99 
However, debates which took place in constitutional convention committees must be 
placed in perspective; they are individual expressions of concepts as the speakers perceive them 
and, although they are sometimes illuminating, affording a sense of direction, they are not 
decisive as to intent of the general convention or of the people in adopting the measures; 
committee debates will be looked to only in the absence of guidance in constitutional language 
as well as in the "Address to the People" or when court finds in the debates a recurring thread of 
explanation binding together the whole of a constitutional concept.100 
Notably, in examining the constitutional debates, the Supreme Court has held that where 
“provided by law” is used in a constitutional provision, the drafters intended that the legislature 
should do the entire job of implementing that provision.101  Conversely, the term “prescribed by 
law” indicates that the section itself provides the overall plan for its own implementation, and the 
legislature is delegated only the power to specify certain details.102  Additionally, in construing 
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statutory language, the Supreme Court must independently determine the meaning of all 
constitutional terms, even if they have been defined by the statute.103 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has also set forth three general rules to use in 
interpreting the meaning of gubernatorial executive orders issued under the 1963 Constitution.104  
First, the executive intends the meaning that is clearly expressed and an unambiguous executive 
order does not need interpretation.105  Second, the corollary of the first rule is that every word, 
sentence and section of the order should be given effect, if possible.106  Finally, if the meaning of 
an executive order is in doubt, the interpretation given by the agency administering it is 
persuasive as to the meaning of the order unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
order.107 
B. Constitutional Bases of Power Traditionally Cited in Executive Orders  
Thus, today, a consistent pattern has developed with respect to the powers implicated by 
gubernatorial executive orders.  As seen earlier, the Executive Orders, Executive Directives, and 
Proclamations that Governors Romney, Milliken, Blanchard, Engler and Granholm issued during 
their terms all generally fall within one of six broad categories of powers authorized by 
constitutional and statutory authority.  Therefore, the following section will further illustrate 
these powers in order to better understand their basis and the scope. 
 1. Temporary or Special Commissions Power 
The most ubiquitous traditional category of executive power used to authorize 
gubernatorial executive orders is the power to appoint temporary or special commissions.  The 
most obvious example of this power is set forth in Article 5, section 4 of the 1963 Constitution.  
This section provides that, “[t]emporary commissions or agencies for special purposes with a life 
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of no more than two years may be established by law and need not be allocated within a principal 
department.”108 
The language referring to “a principal department,” refers to Article 5, section 2, which 
states, in part: 
All executive and administrative offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the 
executive branch of state government and their respective functions, powers and 
duties, except for the office of governor and lieutenant governor and the 
governing bodies of institutions of higher education provided for in this 
constitution, shall be allocated by law among and within not more than 20 
principal departments. They shall be grouped as far as practicable according to 
major purposes.109 
 
Section 2 requires that the approximately 130 various state administrative agencies, 
boards, commissions, and departments existing when the 1963 Constitution entered into effect be 
grouped together according to their major purposes in no more than twenty principle 
departments, not including the offices of the governor and lieutenant governor, and the 
governing bodies of state colleges and universities.  Accordingly, under section 4, the governor 
may establish temporary commissions or agencies that exist independently of any other state 
departments organized pursuant to section 2, and these temporary commissions may only exist 
for two years from their date of creation.  Although this section has never been specifically 
interpreted by the courts, any interpretation would likely correspond to the plain meaning of the 
constitutional provision. 
However, the governor’s power to form temporary or special commissions is not limited 
to those set forth in section 4.  Sections 1, and 8 of Article 5, have also served in conjunction as a 
basis for the governor to appoint temporary or special commissions.110  Section 1, a carryover 
from the 1908 Constitution,111 provides that: “[t]he executive power is vested in the 
governor.”112  Section 8, which is also carried over from the 1908 Constitution,113 provides that: 
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Each principal department shall be under the supervision of the governor unless 
otherwise provided by this constitution. The governor shall take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed. He shall transact all necessary business with the officers of 
government and may require information in writing from all executive and 
administrative state officers, elective and appointive, upon any subject relating to 
the duties of their respective offices.114 
 
These sections, respectively, vest the governor with executive and supervisory power 
over the executive branch.  Although limited by section 2 (any temporary or special commissions 
created pursuant to sections 1 and 8 must fall within the departments mandated by section 2, as 
opposed to section 4 which allows for temporary or special commissions independent of those 
departments), sections 1 and 8 appear to grant the governor an inherent ability to appoint 
temporary or special commissions anywhere within the executive branch, be they in the 
executive office itself, or in any other department mandated under the Executive Organization 
Act of 1965.115 
Correspondingly, the governor’s constitutional ability to create special commissions 
under sections 1 and 8 has been recognized by the state legislature.  For example, in 1931 the 
state legislature enacted the Special Commissions act.116  Under this act, the governor may create 
special commissions of unlimited duration at any time, for any purpose she deems necessary or 
advisable, consisting of as many members she deems appropriate.117  However, any special 
commissions created under this act must fall within the executive office of the governor.118 
Additionally, the legislature has also recognized the governor’s authority to create 
temporary or special commissions within the other departments mandated by Article 5, section 2.  
In 1978, the legislature enacted the Base Conversion Authority act,119  which allows the 
governor, upon notification by the federal government that a federal military installation in 
Michigan is to be closed, and upon resolution by the local township authority with jurisdiction 
over the area of the military installation requesting the establishment of a base conversion 
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authority, to issue an Executive Order to create a base conversion authority within the 
Department of Labor and Economic Growth.120 
Finally, the governor’s inherent authority to create special or temporary commissions has 
also been recognized by the United States Congress.  A number of federal statutes delegate the 
authority to state governors to implement those federal statutes by gubernatorial executive order, 
and Michigan governors have done so.121  Although the propriety of such delegations may be 
questioned under the concept of federalism, no gubernatorial Executive Orders issued in 
Michigan pursuant to these statutes have yet been challenged in the courts. 
2. Emergency Powers 
A second frequently used traditional category of power is the governor’s emergency 
powers.  Although emergencies on their own do not create power or authority in a governor, they 
may afford occasions for the exercise of powers already existing.122  Executive orders issued 
pursuant to the emergency powers usually involve two steps.  Under the first step, the governor 
invokes the emergency powers by declaring some type of disaster or emergency under her 
Article 5, section 1, executive authority.  The legislature has delegated the governor the ability to 
declare a state of emergency or disaster under section 1 in three different ways: the Emergency 
Management Act,123 the Emergency Powers of the Governor act,124 and the Declaration of State 
of Energy Emergency Act.125 
The Emergency Management Act is a broad grant of authority that delegates 
responsibility to the governor to cope with dangers to the state or its people in a time of 
emergency.  The act allows the governor to proclaim a state of emergency or disaster through 
Executive Orders, Directives or Proclamations carrying the force of law.126  Such declarations 
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continue to exist for 28 days, at which point they automatically terminate unless both houses of 
the legislature, by resolution, approve of a request by the governor for an extension.127 
Additionally any Executive Order, Directive, or Proclamation declaring a state of 
emergency or disaster must state the nature of the threat, the areas threatened, the conditions 
causing the threat, and the conditions that would allow the state of emergency or disaster to 
terminate.128   Such an order must be filed with the Secretary of State and the State Police and 
disseminated promptly in order to bring it to the public’s attention.129  Furthermore, any order 
declaring a state of emergency or disaster under the Emergency Management Act also authorizes 
the governor to deploy any supplies stockpiled pursuant to the act; accept assistance from the 
federal government; or enter into reciprocal aid agreements with other states, the federal 
government, or a neighboring state or province of another country.130  Two examples of such 
agreements are the Interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact; Equipment,131 and 
the Interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact; Personnel.132 
The Emergency Management Act also empowers the governor to suspend regulatory 
statutes, orders or rules (excluding those related to the criminal process or criminal procedures) 
when compliance would hinder or delay necessary action; utilize all available state and federal 
resources as reasonably necessary; transfer department functions; commandeer private property; 
direct and compel evacuations; prescribe modes of ingress or egress for evacuations; limit or 
suspend the sale of alcohol, tobacco, firearms, explosives, and combustibles; provide for 
temporary emergency housing; and direct all other actions necessary or appropriate.133  
Furthermore, the act states that anyone who willfully disobeys an order related to the 
aforementioned powers is guilty of a misdemeanor.134 
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Finally, the Emergency Management Act also authorizes the governor to declare a 
heightened state of alert in order to prevent terrorist acts or apprehend terrorists.135  Under this 
section of the act, the governor is afforded the same powers as in the event of a state of 
emergency or disaster, except that she may not limit the sale of alcohol.136  Furthermore, a 
heightened state of alert lasts 60 days, rather than 28, but may also be extended pursuant to the 
approval of both houses of the legislature.137 
The second legislatively delegated gubernatorial authority to declare a state of emergency 
or disaster under Article 5, section 1 is the Emergency Powers of the Governor act.  This act 
grants the governor broad powers strikingly similar to those granted under the Emergency 
Management Act.138  Moreover, the Emergency Powers of the Governor act explicitly states its 
intent to give the governor broad power to act, as well as the requirement that the act be broadly 
construed.139 
 The third statute that authorizes the governor to invoke her emergency powers is the 
Declaration of State of Energy Emergency Act.  Under this act, the governor can declare, by 
Executive Order, or Proclamation, a state of energy emergency.140  An energy emergency is a 
condition of danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the citizens of the state due to an 
impending or present energy shortage.141  A state of energy emergency continues for 90 days, or 
until the governor finds the emergency has passed – whichever is shorter – and the legislature 
may approve an extension for a specific number of days, or terminate the state of energy 
emergency by a concurrent resolution adopted by a record roll call vote by a majority of the 
members elected to and serving in each house of the legislature.142 
 Once the governor declares a state of energy emergency, she may order specific 
restrictions on the use and sale of energy resources, including restrictions on the interior 
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temperature of public, commercial, industrial, and school buildings; restrictions on the hours of 
the day in which those buildings may be open; restrictions on the lighting levels in those 
buildings; restrictions on the conditions for sale of energy resources to consumers; restrictions on 
the display of decorative lighting; restrictions on the use of privately owned vehicles and the 
reduction of speed limits; restrictions on public transportation (including ordering facilities 
closed); and restrictions on pupil transportation by public schools.143  The governor may also 
direct energy suppliers to provide an energy resource to any person or facility that provides an 
essential service for health, safety or welfare of state residents, and may suspend, by Executive 
Order with specificity, a directly related regulatory statute (excluding those related to the 
criminal process or criminal procedures) when compliance would hinder or delay any necessary 
action.144 
 If a state of energy emergency is declared, the governor may implement any of the 
provisions of the act by executive order, directive or proclamation,145 and individuals who 
knowingly violate such orders, directives or proclamations are subject to a misdemeanor.146  
Additionally, a declaration of a state of energy emergency does not limit, modify, or abridge the 
governor’s powers to declare state of emergency under the Emergency Management Act, or 
interfere with any of the governor’s other constitutional or statutory powers.147 
Therefore, once the governor declares a state of emergency or disaster, she may then take 
the second step involved in issuing an Executive Order pursuant to her emergency powers: 
sending in elements of the state militia pursuant to her powers as commander in chief under 
Article 5, section 12, which provides that, “[t]he governor shall be commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces and may call them out to execute the laws, suppress insurrections and repel 
invasion.”  This provision reflects similar language from the 1908 Constitution,148 and it is 
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implemented by the Michigan Military Act,149 which states that the governor is commander in 
chief of the militia, and may order any members of the organized or unorganized militia150 to 
active state service in case of riot, tumult, breach of the peace, resistance of process, or for 
service in aid of civil authority, whether state or federal, or in time of public danger, disaster, 
crisis, catastrophe or other public emergency within the state.151 
Additionally, under the Michigan Military Act, the governor may enter into an agreement 
with the governors of one or more other states authorizing the joint use of state military forces in 
time of invasion, rebellion, public disaster, or catastrophe, or to assist with drug enforcement,152  
and may order Michigan military forces into another state in pursuit of insurrectionists, 
saboteurs, enemies or enemy forces, in the event of war, or other declared emergency, until other 
state or federal forces can take up the pursuit.153 
The governor may also order the organization, disbanding, arrangement, transfer, 
conversion, alteration, consolidation, or attachment of units of the state military establishment;154 
declare martial law, when forces are deployed, in order to promote the maintenance of law and 
order;155 promote officers and warrant officers of the organized militia;156 prescribe the awarding 
of medals and public recognition for distinguished service, longevity, acts of valor or meritorious 
achievement to members of the organized militia, or to other individuals who have rendered 
appropriate service to the military establishment;157 and appoint a board of 3 national guard 
officers, to inquire into and make recommendations for the payment of compensation, claims, 
medical attention, hospital treatment, funeral expenses, and other expenses for a member of the 
state military establishment injured, disabled, or killed during the performance of active state 
service or special duty.158 
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However, while the Governor is commander-in-chief of the militia, the governor’s ability 
to remove or otherwise discipline officers of the militia is unclear.  In McDonald v Schnipke, the 
Supreme Court held that the governor may not remove or otherwise discipline officers of the 
militia.159  However, McDonald was decided based upon Michigan law prior to the enactment of 
the Executive Organization Act of 1965,160 which provides that the Adjutant General serves at 
the pleasure of the Governor.  As a result, the Governor likely has authority to remove the 
Adjutant General, despite the holding in McDonald. 
  3. Budgetary Powers 
The third category of gubernatorial power traditionally relied upon to issue executive 
orders is the governor’s power to reduce appropriations.  This power, one of a number of broad 
budgetary powers granted to the governor under the 1963 Constitution,161 arises from Article 5, 
section 20, which states: 
No appropriation shall be a mandate to spend. The governor, with the approval of 
the appropriating committees of the house and senate, shall reduce expenditures 
authorized by appropriations whenever it appears that actual revenues for a fiscal 
period will fall below the revenue estimates on which appropriations for that 
period were based. Reductions in expenditures shall be made in accordance with 
procedures prescribed by law. 
 
 This provision is new to the 1963 Constitution.  It grants the governor power to control 
state expenditures in the interest of a balanced budget.  The Michigan Constitution of 1963 
requires a balanced state budget under Article 5, section 18, which provides: “[p]roposed 
expenditures from any fund shall not exceed the estimated revenue thereof;” and Article 6, 
section 31, which provides: 
Any bill requiring an appropriation to carry out its purpose shall be considered an 
appropriation bill. One of the general appropriation bills as passed by the 
legislature shall contain an itemized statement of estimated revenue by major 
source in each operating fund for the ensuing fiscal period, the total of which shall 
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not be less than the total of all appropriations made from each fund in the general 
appropriation bills as passed. 
 
Under Article 5, section 20, the governor, with the approval of the appropriations 
committees of each house of the legislature, must cut expenditures when economic indicators 
predict that actual revenues will fall short of estimated revenues.  However, the governor cannot 
reduce expenditures of the legislature or the judiciary, or from funds created by the constitution 
and dedicated to a specific purpose. 
 This power has been implemented by the legislature through the Management and Budget 
Act,162 which authorizes the Governor to determine which appropriations to reduce to remedy the 
shortfall, and issue an Executive Order, subject to approval by the House and Senate 
appropriations committees, implementing the reduction.163  The governor must give the 
committees five days advance notice before submitting an expenditure reduction, and the 
committees must vote to approve or reject the governor’s recommendations in a resolution 
within ten days of receiving the order.164  The order is not effective if rejected by either 
committee.165  In that event, the governor must wait 30 days, but may then begin the process 
again.166  If approved by both committees, the order becomes effective when filed with the 
Secretary of State (along with the both resolutions approving the order).167  In interpreting this 
section, the Supreme Court has held that the governor has discretion to reduce expenditures of 
some agencies to a greater extent than expenditures of others and no requirement of 
proportionality exists with respect to the reductions.168 
  4. Supervisory Powers 
A fourth traditional category of gubernatorial power that Michigan governors have 
utilized to issue executive orders arises from the governor’s general supervisory powers over the 
executive branch.  The Michigan Constitution of 1963 vests responsibility for the supervision of 
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the executive branch of state government in the governor, and the governor may make 
reasonable delegations of executive or administrative duties.169  The governor’s supervisory 
powers arise mainly from Article 5, section 8 of the 1963 Constitution, which provides: 
Each principal department shall be under the supervision of the governor unless 
otherwise provided by this constitution. The governor shall take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed. He shall transact all necessary business with the officers of 
government and may require information in writing from all executive and 
administrative state officers, elective and appointive, upon any subject relating to 
the duties of their respective offices. 
With the exception of the first sentence placing each principal department under the 
supervision of the governor, this language is identical to language in the 1908 Constitution.170  
“Since 1835, the governor has been charged with the responsibility of taking care that the laws 
are faithfully executed.  Each Michigan constitution has allowed the governor to request 
information in writing from state officers in the executive branch.”171 
Section 8 has been subject to only limited judicial interpretation.  But the Court of 
Appeals has interpreted the provision broadly, stating that it allows the governor to require that 
department heads comply with executive orders, and that the governor’s use of the word 
“request” rather than the word “order” is irrelevant for the purpose of determining the binding 
effect of a gubernatorial executive order on an administrative department head.172  However, the 
Supreme Court has imposed a narrow restriction on this power, ruling that section 8 prevents the 
governor from employing outside counsel at the expense of the state to advise him on drafting 
proposed legislation because the phrase allowing the governor to require information in writing 
from executive branch state officers simultaneously compels the governor to seek legal advice 
from the attorney general.173  Even so, despite that narrow limitation, section 8 arguably grants 
the governor broad authority over the administration of the executive branch, and serves as the 
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basis by which the governor may issue Executive Orders, Directives or Proclamations having 
binding effect on members of the executive branch. 
Another constitutional provision that arguably provides a basis for the governor’s 
supervisory powers is Article 5, section 1.  However, the text of this section, which vests the 
executive authority in the governor, is largely undefined, and offers even less guidance than 
section 8.  Finally, the governor’s authority under Article 5, section 10, which provides, in part, 
that, “[t]he governor shall have power and it shall be his duty to inquire into the condition and 
administration of any public office and the acts of any public officer, elective or appointive,” 
may also possibly serve as a basis by which the governor may exercise supervisory authority 
over the executive branch. 
5.  Removal Powers 
A rarely used traditional category of gubernatorial power that has been used to issue 
executive orders is the governor’s removal powers.  These powers fall within one of three 
categories: the power to remove state officers, the power to remove local officers, and the power 
to remove judges.  With respect to state officers, Article V, section 10 states that: 
The governor shall have power and it shall be his duty to inquire into the 
condition and administration of any public office and the acts of any public 
officer, elective or appointive. He may remove or suspend from office for gross 
neglect of duty or for corrupt conduct in office, or for any other misfeasance or 
malfeasance therein, any elective or appointive state officer, except legislative or 
judicial, and shall report the reasons for such removal or suspension to the 
legislature. 
 
The Constitution of 1850 was the first Michigan Constitution to contain authority 
granting the governor power to remove state officials.174  However, this authority, also contained 
in the 1908 constitution, allowed for the governor to remove state officials only when the 
legislature was not in session. 175  Under the 1963 Constitution that limitation is eliminated, 
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although the current provision still does not extend to officers of the legislative or judicial 
branches. 
“Removal” is defined as deprivation of office by the act of a competent superior officer 
acting within his or her scope of authority.176  The governor has the power to remove state 
officers only for cause, and must give notice and an opportunity for a hearing.177  Furthermore, 
misfeasance is defined as “a default in not doing a lawful thing in a proper manner, or omitting 
to do it as it should be done,”178 and malfeasance is the failure to perform the duties of a public 
office.179  The Supreme Court described the details of the removal power in Attorney General ex 
rel Rich v Jochim, stating: 
[The Governor] is given inquisitional power, that [she] may ascertain their 
condition, for the public welfare.  No other means is provided for acquiring the 
necessary information.  If [she] discovers irregularities of particular character, it is 
[her] duty to remove the officer, and supply his place by appointment, reporting 
[her] action to the Legislature at the next session.  Dullam v Willson is authority 
for the proposition that the incumbent is entitled to notice of the charge, and an 
opportunity to be heard in his defense.  This necessarily implies that the 
governor’s action is, in a sense, judicial.  But it does not follow that the 
investigation must be made by some other person or officer, who must make 
complaint to the Governor; that the complainant must procure consul; or that the 
Governor is necessarily interested, and thereby disqualified from hearing and 
determining, because [she] performs the other duties which are specifically 
imposed upon [her] by this section of the Constitution. . .  There is nothing in the 
record to show any interest upon the part of the Governor, further than to 
ascertain the condition of the office, and to action upon the information obtained 
as the Constitution requires.  It is the duty of the Governor to investigate, using all 
lawful means to go to the bottom of any real or supposed irregularity.  To that 
end, [she] may use clerks and expert accountants, if necessary, and it is fair to 
presume that the State would recognize.180 
 
The governor’s power to remove state officials under section 10 is self-executing and not 
subject to implementation by the Legislature.181  Even though the legislature has enacted 
statutory provisions relating to the removal of the Attorney General and the Secretary of State,182 
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members of the governing bodies of state universities,183 and appointees filling vacant offices 
during a legislative recess,184 all constitutional officers are removable by the Governor.185 
In contrast186 to the governor’s ability to remove state officials, the governor’s ability to 
remove local officials under Article VII, section 33 is not self-executing.  This section provides 
that, “[a]ny elected officer of a political subdivision may be removed from office in the manner 
and for the causes provided by law.”187  Thus, the governor’s power to remove officers of a 
political subdivision is implemented by the Michigan Election Law,188 which includes provisions 
for removal of most local offices.189  However, the governor does not have power to remove 
county executives, members of community college boards, and school district board members, as 
the legislature has not granted the governor such power. 
The Governor’s power to remove local officials is generally not subject to judicial 
review,190 unless an exercise of the removal power is arbitrary.191  Once again however, the 
Governor must afford the accused public officer notice and a reasonable opportunity to present a 
defense,192 and an accused public officer is entitled to fair and just treatment in the course of the 
removal proceedings.193  Nevertheless, despite these protections for the accused, the Governor is 
the sole tribunal in removal proceedings, and the accused has no right of appeal or review.  If the 
Governor acts within the law, the Governor’s decision is final.194 
Finally, the governor may remove judges from office under Article 6, section 25, but only 
upon the concurrence of the legislature.  This section provides that: 
For reasonable cause, which is not sufficient ground for impeachment, the 
governor shall remove any judge on a concurrent resolution of two-thirds of the 
members elected to and serving in each house of the legislature. The cause for 
removal shall be stated at length in the resolution.195 
 
Once again, this authority reflects language from the 1908 Constitution.196  The 
governor’s power to remove is implemented by the Michigan Election Law197 which contains 
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sections providing for the removal of Justices of the Supreme Court,198 Judges of the Court of 
Appeals,199 Circuit Court Judges,200 Probate Court Judges,201 and District Court Judges.202 
  6. Re-organization Powers 
   a) Explicit Re-organization Power 
The final generally recognized category of power that a governor may use to issue an 
executive order deals with the governor’s power to re-organize the executive branch.  The 1963 
Constitution explicitly grants the governor the power to effect re-organizations of the executive 
branch in Article 5, section 2, which states: 
Subsequent to the initial allocation, the governor may make changes in the 
organization of the executive branch or in the assignment of functions among its 
units which he considers necessary for efficient administration. Where these 
changes require the force of law, they shall be set forth in executive orders and 
submitted to the legislature. Thereafter the legislature shall have 60 calendar days 
of a regular session, or a full regular session if of shorter duration, to disapprove 
each executive order. Unless disapproved in both houses by a resolution 
concurred in by a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house, 
each order shall become effective at a date thereafter to be designated by the 
governor. 
 
In addition to granting the governor the power to re-organize the executive branch, 
Article 5, section 2 requires that: 
All executive and administrative offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the 
executive branch of state government and their respective functions, powers and 
duties, except for the office of governor and lieutenant governor and the 
governing bodies of institutions of higher education provided for in this 
constitution, shall be allocated by law among and within not more than 20 
principal departments. They shall be grouped as far as practicable according to 
major purposes. 
 
Section 12 of the Schedule and Temporary provisions to the 1963 Constitution gave the 
legislature two years after the effective date of the new constitution to make the initial allocation 
of agencies.203  However, if the Legislature failed to complete the reassignments in two years, the 
Governor was given the authority to make the initial reorganization within one year thereafter.204   
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But the legislature successfully completed its task, reorganizing state administrative agencies 
into nineteen principal departments in the Executive Organization Act of 1965.205 
The Executive Organization Act of 1965 implements the constitutional provisions and 
sets out an organizational plan for the executive branch of government.  The Act also establishes 
a classification system that identifies three types of transfers to consolidate all state agencies into 
19 departments.  A type I transfer agency retains all its substantive powers, but staff activities 
such as budgeting and procurement are provided by the head of the principal department.206  
Under a type II transfer, all powers, duties, and functions are transferred to the principal 
department, and the transferred agency exercises only those duties delegated to it by the 
department head.207  A type III transfer provides for the transfer of the agency to the principal 
department and the abolishment of the agency.208  Additionally, a fourth type of classification 
continues to exist within the principal department and exercises all of is statutory powers.209  
Finally, the head of each principal department, with the approval of the governor, is authorized to 
establish the internal organization of the department.210 
The Executive Organization Act of 1965 also sets for the procedures required in issuing 
an executive re-organization order.  Whenever the governor makes changes in the organization 
of the executive branch or in the assignment of functions among its units which require the force 
of law, such changes must be set forth in executive orders and copies of the orders must be 
submitted to the legislature as provided in section 2 of article 5 of the state constitution.211  An 
executive re-organization order must be filed with the department of state in the same manner as 
required by law for the filing of public acts of the state,212 and copies of each such executive 
order must be filed with and retained on record by the legislative council and a copy transmitted 
to each member of the legislature.213 
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The Legislature then has no more than 60 calendar days during a regular session (or a full 
regular session if less than 60 days) to disapprove the order.214  Unless disapproved by a 
concurrent resolution of a majority of the members serving in both the House of Representatives 
and the State Senate, an executive re-organization order becomes effective at the date designated 
by the governor.215  Executive re-organization orders not overturned by the Legislature have the 
force and effect of law,216 and they must be dated, given an identification number, and published 
in the same manner as required by law for the publication of the public acts of the state.217  
Although an executive reorganization order may be modified or repealed by the legislature at any 
time by law,218 it bears note that no executive reorganization order has been disapproved by the 
Michigan Legislature in nearly 40 years. 
However, although the Executive Organization Act of 1965 was enacted to implement 
the governor’s constitutional re-organization power and to allow the governor to reshape the 
executive branch of state government,219 the act does not limit the Governor’s broad 
reorganization authority under Article 5, section 2.220  Re-organization orders may “effect 
something as limited as a transfer of functions among executive branch entities or as broad as 
alterations in the very structure of the executive branch.”221  The only constitutional limitations 
placed on the Governor in effecting a re-organization are that a re-organization may not result in 
the establishment of more than 20 principal departments, and that the reorganization is subject to 
disapproval by the legislature. 
Additionally, while the Governor may assign or reassign functions within the executive 
branch by executive order, executive orders may not alter statutory functions.  Thus, for 
example, while Governor Engler was not constitutionally able diminish or abolish authority 
legislatively-delegated to the State Board of Education, he was able to transfer that authority to 
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the Superintendent of Public Instruction by Executive Order.222  Similarly, former Governor 
Milliken could constitutionally transfer to the Natural Resources Commission rule-promulgation 
authority formerly delegated by the legislature to the Water Resources Commission.223 
  b) Inherent Authority Supporting Re-organizations 
In addition to section 2, the inherent power granted to the governor by Article 5, sections 
1 (vesting executive authority in the governor) and 8 (granting the governor supervisory 
authority over the executive branch), may also serve as constitutional bases for Executive Re-
organization Orders.224  Section 2 is new to the 1963 Constitution, but its basis lies in a similar 
1958 act that granted the governor re-organization power over the executive branch.225  Public 
Act 125 authorized the governor to submit reorganization plans within the first 30 days of any 
regular legislative session.226  Any reorganization plan became effective 90 days after the 
legislative adjournment unless disapproved within 60 legislative days by either house of the 
legislature.227 
Public Act 125 of 1958228 was enacted while the 1908 Constitution was in effect.  Under 
the separation of powers doctrine, the legislature may delegate some of its functions, but only to 
lawful public agencies or other branches of the government: not to private individuals or 
corporations.229  Thus, the legislature was able to delegate its re-organization authority to the 
governor under the Act because of the inherent executive authority vested in the governor by the 
1908 Constitution.230  Thus, although the legislature ultimately repealed Public Act 125 of 
1958,231 the inherent executive authority in Article 5, section 1 is often cited in Executive Re-
organization Orders as a constitutional basis supporting the governor’s authority to issue an 
Executive Order.232 
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Additionally, Article 5 section 8, which vests supervisory power over the executive 
branch in the governor, has also been cited as a constitutional basis for issuing Executive Re-
organization Orders.233  The delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1961 added an explicit 
grant of supervisory power over the executive branch in recognition of the governor’s 
responsibility to make sure the departments of the executive branch performed their duties as 
provided by law.234  Therefore, as the natural corollary of the responsibility to supervise the 
executive branch is the right to take action to ensure that the executive branch continues to 
function, section 8 also supports the assertion that the governor is inherently authorized to issue 
executive orders. 
Unfortunately, however, previous Michigan governors have cited sections 1 and 8 as 
support for the governor’s authority to issue Executive Re-organization Orders in a seemingly 
arbitrary manner.235  Thus, while these two sections may be utilized to support the re-
organization authority in section 2, no concrete rules have arisen to explain when or why their 
inclusion might be necessary in a given situation.  
C. Constitutional Bases of Power Traditionally Not Cited in Executive Orders  
The Michigan Constitution of 1963 also grants powers to the governor that could 
theoretically serve as the basis by which the governor could issue an executive order.  However, 
although Michigan governors have exercised some of these powers to order some kind of action, 
no governor has explicitly used these powers to support an Executive Orders, Directive or 
Proclamation.  Nonetheless, each one could presumably serve, at least in conjunction with the 
aforementioned powers, if not on its own, as a basis by which the governor may issue an 
executive order. 
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1. Special Sessions of the Legislature 
No Michigan governor has used the constitutional power to convene special sessions of 
the legislature in an executive order.  Article 5, section 15 of the 1963 Constitution provides that, 
“[t]he governor may convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions.”  This language is the 
same as language contained in the 1908 constitution.236  The Governor has the power under 
section 15 to “communicate by message to the legislature at the beginning of each session 
[including extra sessions] and may at other times present to the legislature information as to the 
affairs of the state and recommend measures he [or she] considers necessary or desirable.”237 
However, the Governor may not call a joint convention of the House of Representatives 
and the State Senate.238  “When the legislature is convened on extraordinary occasions in special 
session, no bill shall be passed on any subjects other than those expressly stated in the governor’s 
proclamation or submitted by special message.”239  Although the governor may control the 
subject-matter of legislation to be enacted at special session, the governor may not restrict 
boundaries within the natural range of that subject, dictate legislative methods, or limit the class 
of those affected.240  Accordingly, the governor may not restrict the Legislature to consideration 
of a particular bill, since, within the subject submitted by the Governor, the Legislature has 
freedom of action.  During an extra session, the Legislature may consider proposed constitutional 
amendments, regardless of the scope of the Governor’s proclamation or special message.241 
Additionally, in the event of an emergency, the Governor may convene the Legislature, 
whether in regular or extra session, outside of Lansing.  Article 5, section 16 of the 1963 
Constitution provides that, “[t]he governor may convene the legislature at some other place when 
the seat of government becomes dangerous from any cause.”  This section is also substantially 
similar to language found in the 1908 Constitution which states, “[the governor] may convene 
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the legislature at some other place when the seat of government becomes dangerous from disease 
or a common enemy.”242  The change in this language reflects the concern among the framers 
about the dangers inherent in life in the atomic age, and the observation that disease or enemies 
do not represent the only threats that could justify removal of the legislature from the capitol.243 
 2. Writs of Election 
Similarly, no governor has cited the authority to issue writs of election in an executive 
order.  Article 5, section 13 of the 1963 Constitution provides that: “[t]he governor shall issue 
writs of election to fill vacancies in the senate or house of representatives.  Any such election 
shall be held in a manner prescribed by law.”244  With the exception of the addition of the second 
sentence regarding the manner of holding elections, this provision is identical to its analogue in 
the 1908 Constitution.245 
In calling a special election, the governor must comply with the Michigan Election Law, 
which specifies the procedures by which such elections are to be called.246  Under the Election 
Law, the governor has the discretion to call a special election247 or direct that the vacancy be 
filled by voters at the next general election.248  Therefore, although the governor has no 
discretion as to whether to fill a vacancy, the governor does have discretion as to when that 
vacancy shall be filled, whether at a special election occurring prior to the next general election, 
or at a special election happening concurrent to the next general election. 
The Governor must call a special election to fill vacancies in the State Senate,249 the State 
House of Representatives,250 the Michigan delegation of the United States House of 
Representatives,251 and in limited circumstances, township offices.252  When calling a special 
election for a partisan office, a primary election and nominating process is required.  Section 631 
of the Election Law provides: 
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Whenever a special election shall be called to fill a vacancy in any office, the 
candidates for which are regularly nominated in accordance with the provisions of 
this act relating to primary nominations, a special primary for all political parties 
shall be held in the county, district or city in which the vacancy occurs on such 
day as may be fixed by the official or legislative body calling the special election, 
but not less than 20 days prior to the date of such special election, and the 
authorities calling any such special primary shall, in the call therefor, fix the time 
within which candidates may file nominating petitions.253 
 3. Clemency Powers 
Finally, Michigan governors have traditionally not cited their clemency powers when 
issuing executive orders.  The governor has exclusive authority to grant reprieves, commutations, 
and pardons for criminal offenses.  Article 5, section 4 of the 1963 Constitution provides: 
The governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons 
after convictions for all offenses, except cases of impeachment, upon such 
conditions and limitations as he may direct, subject to procedures and regulations 
prescribed by law.  He shall inform the legislature annually of each reprieve, 
commutation and pardon granted, stating the reasons therefor. 
 The clemency powers are exclusive in the governor, and the Michigan Supreme Court, 
interpreting an identical analogue in the 1908 Constitution,254 has held that any law restricting 
the Governor’s power of pardon and commutation of sentence is unconstitutional and void.255  
As a result, once a court imposes a sentence, and the defendant has commenced serving that 
sentence, a court may only alter the conviction or sentence for legally cognizable reasons.  
Action in excess of that authority infringes on the governor’s exclusive clemency powers.256 
However, the Governor’s power to pardon is not absolute.  Punishment for contempt of 
court, for example, is an offense within the exclusive control of the judiciary, and the governor’s 
pardoning power is not applicable.  Furthermore, when exercising her clemency powers, the 
governor is subject to procedures and regulations set forth in law.  In particular, the Corrections 
Code of 1953,257 establishes the State Parole Board within the Department of Corrections,258 and 
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articulates the specific procedures for pardons, reprieves, and commutations, including 
application, investigation, public hearing, and recommendation to the Governor.259 
C. Inherent Authority to issue Executive Orders 
In the event that no provision under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 provides specific 
authority for the governor to act in a situation, the executive and supervisory authority contained 
in sections 1 and 8 of Article 5 might also grant the governor a broad, inherent power to take 
action by executive order.  Most state constitutions contain provisions vesting supervisory and 
executive powers in the governor, especially provisions providing that the governor is to 
faithfully execute the law.260  Generally, most courts are split in opinion as to whether or not 
these types of executive and supervisory provisions grant power in and of themselves.261  On one 
side are those who have found that these provisions do not represent a constitutional grant of 
executive order powers: the ‘weak governor’ argument.262  On the other side are those who feel 
that these provisions do vest a governor with authority to act: the ‘strong governor’ argument.263 
Proponents of the “weak governor” argument often cite cases holding that the general 
constitutional language does not vest governors with rights because it does not confer specific 
power, that a broad grant is limited by later specific grants of executive power, and that such 
general constitutional language is only declaratory and not binding.264  In contrast, proponents of 
the “strong governor” argument maintain that a grant of executive power is "something more 
than a verbal adornment of the office, and implies such power as will secure an efficient 
execution of the laws" and that the phrase "the executive power shall vest in the governor" would 
be meaningless if the governor's powers were, in fact, limited to those which are specifically 
enumerated.265  The relative abstraction or lack of specific detail in a constitutional provision 
implies a desire on the part of the drafters to impart managerial flexibility. 
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Records from the Constitutional Convention of 1961 indicate that the drafters supported 
an interpretation of the constitution in line with the ‘strong governor’ argument.  The drafters 
stated in their address to the people of Michigan that the provision was exactly the same as the 
similar provision contained in the 1908 constitution, with the exception that the word “chief” 
before “executive power” was eliminated due to the possibility that it could be interpreted as a 
limitation on the exercise of executive power.266  The drafters intended that like the President 
under the United States Constitution, the ultimate rights and responsibilities for the exercise of 
executive power (or lack thereof) should lie with the governor.267  Indeed, opponents of the 
language who were overruled objected that the new language was only appropriate if the drafters 
intention was to, “make all parts of the executive branch subservient completely to the 
governor.”268 
These statements indicate that the drafters meant for these provisions to be a very real, 
binding grant of authority to the governor as the executive officer.  Although specific 
constitutional grants of authority to the governor were also included in other provisions, the 
drafters’ comments indicate that they were not intended to limit the broad grant of executive 
power.  Rather, the comments show that the drafters did indeed intend to grant the governor 
authority to exercise her executive power to the fullest possible extent. 
 Adopting the strong governor argument, a Wisconsin commentator recently set forth a 
model test of judicial enforcement for determining the validity of gubernatorial executive orders 
issued pursuant to this inherent authority.269  The commentator, Benjamin S. Longlet, proposed a 
three-prong test whereby an executive order issued pursuant to a governor’s executive or 
supervisory authority is valid so long as the order is: 1) non-legislative, 2) issued pursuant to 
some constitutional authority, and 3) consistent with existing law.270 
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 In determining whether a function is non-legislative, Longlet stated that: 
The crucial test for determining whether an ordinance is legislative or 
administrative, therefore, is whether the ordinance makes new law or merely 
executes a preexisting law…  By analogy, if a gubernatorial executive order were, 
by its terms, to balance and choose between competing policy objectives or 
otherwise constitute a ‘high-level overall plan embracing the general goals,’ it 
would be constitutionally invalid and should not be enforced.271 
 
 With regard to constitutional authority, Longlet argues that provisions of the Wisconsin 
Constitution which are substantially similar to the Michigan Constitution of 1963 (an executive 
power clause,272 a “faithfully execute the law” clause,273 and a “transact all necessary business” 
clause274), should be broadly construed to authorize the issuance of executive orders under the 
“strong governor” theory. 275 
Finally, Longlet states that the decision as to whether an executive order is consonant 
with existing statutes revolves around the “faithfully execute the law” clause, and depends on 
whether the reviewing court adopts a “black letter” or “policy implementation” interpretation of 
the clause.276  An executive order could contravene specific statutory language without violating 
the law’s underlying policy objectives, or conversely, violate the purposes of a statute without 
contravening its black-letter terms.277 
Therefore, because this test relies on provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution which are 
substantially Article 5, sections 1 and 8 of the 1963 Constitution, a Michigan court might elect to 
adopt this test as an authoritative determinant of the validity of a gubernatorial executive order 
issued pursuant to those sections. 
V. Conclusion 
The ability of Michigan’s governors to issue executive orders under the Michigan 
Constitution of 1963 has been the subject of a continuous, gradual expansion in the 40 years 
since the 1963 Constitution entered into effect.  As the governor is ultimately accountable to the 
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public for the administration of the executive branch of government, Michigan’s governors will 
likely continue to act unilaterally by executive order in order to achieve the utmost flexibility in 
managing a 21st century state. 
Furthermore, as state governments become more complex, spend more money, and 
employ increasing numbers of people, gubernatorial executive orders will continue to expand, 
both in the number and the scope of subjects they embrace.  Accordingly, the citizens of 
Michigan must possess the resources adequate to allow them to develop to a sufficient 
understanding of the powers granted to their governor, as well as the limitations placed on the 
exercise of that power, in order to safeguard their rights and ensure good governance. 
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